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This study offers the first empirical microeconomic analysis of the effectiveness of dollar debt and
contract redenomination policies to mitigate adverse financial and relative price consequences from
a large devaluation. An analysis of Argentina's policy of devaluation with redenomination in 2002,
in contrast to Mexico's policy of devaluation without debt redenomination in 1994-1995, shows that
devaluation benefited tradables firms, and that dollar debt redenomination in Argentina benefited high-dollar
debtors, as shown in these firms' investment behavior, especially non-tradables firms whose revenues
in dollar terms were adversely affected by devaluation. That investment behavior contrasts with the
experience of Mexican firms in the aftermath of Mexico's large devaluation, in which non-tradables
producers with high dollar debt displayed significant relative reductions in investment. Stock return
reactions to Argentine debt redenomination indicate large, positive, unanticipated effects on high-dollar
debtors from debt redenomination. Energy concession contract redenomination likewise increased
investment by high energy users in Argentina, and that benefit was apparent also in positive stock
returns of those firms.
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  Argentina’s financial crisis of 2001-2002 was one of the most widely anticipated 
emerging market crises in recent years. The inconsistency between persistent fiscal deficits and 
recession, on the one hand, and the inflexible currency regime of “convertibility,” on the other 
hand, became increasingly apparent to market observers from 1999 through 2001. By the end of 
2001, given the political infeasibility of fiscal reform (a fact illustrated by the brief tenure and 
abrupt demise of officials who suggested the desirability of fiscal reform), sovereign default and 
devaluation became inevitable toward the end of 2001.   
  Argentina’s denouement, however, had an unusual and largely unforeseen wrinkle, 
namely “pesification” – the effective redenomination of dollar-denominated debts enforceable 
under domestic law and many other dollar-denominated or dollar-indexed contracts. 
Redenomination of dollar debts implied a substantial reduction of the real debt service burdens 
of dollar-denominated debtors. It was inspired by the realization that without redenomination 
Argentina would have to find a way to address massive, economy-wide insolvency of dollar-
denominated debtors, as well as a huge relative price increase for energy and transport costs that 
were fixed by concession contracts in dollar terms. 
  Although a change in relative prices always has real economic consequences, in a world 
of perfect capital markets, the reallocation of wealth between creditors and debtors, or the 
incidence of financial distress, would not matter for real decisions (like investment, employment 
and consumption). But in the presence of adverse selection, moral hazard, and physical 
contracting costs, wealth reallocations and financial distress can have powerful effects on firms’ 
and consumers’ investment and employment decisions. Hence redenomination policy could have   2 
important effects on investment and consumption as a means of resolving economy-wide 
financial distress and increasing the net worth, and hence the borrowing capacity, of borrowers. 
  A superficial look at Argentina’s macroeconomic performance suggests that the decision 
to redenominate debts, and other dollar-denominated or dollar-indexed contracts, during the 
devaluation of the peso in the beginning of 2002 was successful in reversing the downward trend 
in economic activity. Figure 1 displays the path of quarterly GDP in Argentina from 1999 to 
2005. The beginning of 2002 marked the end of recession and the beginning of a sustained 
recovery. Of course, this evidence is not conclusive, since it does not establish a clear link 
between redenomination policy and macroeconomic performance. In particular, the 
macroeconomic evidence does not disentangle among the three potentially important channels 
through which Argentina’s devaluation with redenomination could have expanded economic 
activity – namely, (1) a boost to exports (as the result of devaluation alone), (2) a reduction in the 
relative price of energy costs, and (3) the implicit transfer of wealth to dollar-denominated 
debtors from debt redenomination alongside devaluation.  
  This study analyzes the effects of redenomination policy on firms in Argentina in the 
aftermath of its devaluation of 2002. The study employs firm-level data to examine how the 
effects of redenomination policy varied across firms depending on their differing levels of dollar-
denominated debt and their different sectoral exposures to devaluation risk (i.e., tradables 
producers versus non-tradables producers). By exploiting the cross-sectional variation in firms’ 
exposure to different consequences of devaluation with redenomination, I am able to distinguish 
the effects of the three channels through which devaluation with redenomination affected firms’ 
behavior. To provide a standard of comparison for the Argentine firms, I view Argentine firms’ 
experiences in 2002-2003 in the mirror of the experiences of Mexican firms in 1995-1996,   3 
during the aftermath of the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995 (a large devaluation in a highly 
dollarized economy that occurred without the redenomination of dollar debts). 
  Section II begins with an analysis of the timing of the Argentine financial crisis. That 
review shows that: (1) Argentina was in an unusually vulnerable macroeconomic position as the 
result of the large fraction of domestic debts and transportation and utility concession contracts 
that were denominated in or indexed to dollars, and the small fraction of its economy devoted to 
exports; (2) the risk of devaluation was widely understood by market participants long in 
advance of the crisis and considered substantial by the market by mid 2001. Section III examines 
the effects of Argentine debt redenomination policy as part of its decision to devalue. Section IV 
adds to that analysis a consideration of effects of the redenomination of utility concession 
contracts.
1 
  Sections III and IV each analyze the investment decisions of Argentine firms. Those 
analyses compare the Argentine (2001-2002) and Mexican (1994-1995) devaluation experiences 
from the perspective of Argentine and Mexican firms’ rates of fixed capital investment. 
Mexico’s devaluation policy did not include redenomination of debt and utility contracts, while 
Argentina’s devaluation policy did include redenomination. The comparison of individual firms’ 
investment behavior shows that Argentina’s decision to redenominate dollar debt and dollar-
indexed utility tariffs in pesos had a salutary effect on the investment decisions of firms, which is 
isolated within the subset of firms that had high dollar debt and operated in the non-tradables 
sector. In Section III, I provide estimates of the size of the effect on Argentine firms from the 
policy of redenominating debt. Section IV extends the analysis of Section III to evaluate the 
                                                 
1  This study considers only the effects of redenomination policy on utility and debt contracts because one cannot 
identify other differences across firms related to redenomination policy (e.g., different firms’ propensities to use toll 
roads, whose tariffs were also affected by redenomination policy). 
   4 
effect of utility tariff redenomination by comparing the investment behavior of high energy 
consuming Argentine firms to those of other firms. The results reported in Section IV show that 
high energy consuming Argentine firms invested more in the year after the crisis than other 
Argentine firms, ceteris paribus. 
  In theory, non-tradable producers with high dollar-denominated debts, and high energy 
consuming firms, should have benefited from redenomination policy, ceteris paribus, more than 
other producers. Unlike non-tradables producers, tradable producers’ dollar-denominated 
revenues are not reduced by devaluation. In fact, the investments by high-dollar debt, non-
tradables producers in Mexico fell more following devaluation than those of high-dollar debt 
tradables producers. But in Argentina, as a result of redenomination, there was no difference in 
investment behavior between highly dollar-indebted tradable and non-tradable producers.   
  Sections III and IV also contain an analysis of Argentine firms’ stock returns during the 
announcement of devaluation policy. Section III’s analysis of stock returns shows that (1) 
redenomination policy was not anticipated by the market, and (2) the advantage of 
redenomination in improving the condition of high-dollar debt firms was understood at the time 
the Argentine government made its decision, and became priced into the market, as is visible in 
highly positive average stock returns during both of the redenomination event windows. 
Apparently, the salutary effect of redenomination was understood by the Argentine stock market 
at the time redenomination policy was announced. Section IV’s analysis of stock prices also 
considers the effect of utility tariff redenomination on stock returns. Holding constant other 
characteristics (including the effects of debt redenomination), high energy consuming Argentine 
firms’ stock returns reacted positively to redenomination news that signaled lower energy costs.    5 
  The results relating to debt redenomination are consistent with the view that debt-
deflation shocks related to the combination of dollar-denominated debt and large devaluation can 
have important adverse short-term consequences for investment. And redenomination policies 
that reallocate wealth from creditors to debtors, and from energy producers to energy consumers, 
can have positive short-term macroeconomic consequences. This study does not measure the 
long-term costs associated with redenomination policy, such as adverse reputational 
consequences in capital markets. Section V offers some observations about the tradeoffs 
policymakers face when considering whether to redenominate contracts during a devaluation.  
 
II. Argentina’s Crisis and Its Vulnerability to Devaluation 
  The Predictability of Collapse 
  In 2000 and 2001, market participants became increasingly concerned about the 
possibility of an Argentine devaluation. Devaluation became a significant possibility as early as 
2000.
2  Figure 2 plots the interest rates on 30-day dollar-denominated and peso-denominated 
deposits for the years 2000 and 2001.  The interest differential between these two deposit interest 
rates, according to covered interest parity arbitrage, is equal to the forward premium on the peso, 
and therefore, is a direct measure of the market’s perception of devaluation risk.
3  The interest 
rate differential, plotted in Figures 3A and 3B, contains a combined forecast of devaluation and a 
risk premium, as follows:
4 
                                                 
2 For a review of the evolving drama from the perspective of markets and policy makers, see Paul Blustein, And the 
Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of Argentina, Public Affairs, 2005. See 
also Pedro Pou, “What Lessons Can Be Learned from Recent Financial Crisis? The Argentine Experience,” 
available at http://www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/sympos/1997/pdf/s97pou.pdf. 
3 For a discussion of covered interest parity, see David O. Beim and Charles W. Calomiris, Emerging Financial 
Markets, Irwin-McGraw Hill, 2000, pp. 248-50. 
4 In this discussion, I abstract from the fact that the 30-day deposit interest rate differential understates the extent of 
devaluation expectations, since the possibility of a redenomination of dollar debts was taken into account by the   6 
 
    iP   -  iD = (perceived probability of devaluation) x (% expected devaluation) + devaluation risk premium 
 
For example, if the peso-denominated interest rate on 30-day deposits is 20% and the dollar-
denominated interest rate on 30-day deposits is 12%, that implies an interest differential of 8%.  
Under the assumption of risk neutrality (where only the first of the two terms above enters into 
market pricing of devaluation risk), an 8% interest rate differential could imply a 20% chance of 
a 40% devaluation sometime during the next thirty days.  That interest differential would also be 
consistent with a 40% chance of a 20% devaluation. Under the assumption of risk aversion, some 
of the interest differential would represent a premium for bearing risk (in excess of simply 
earning an expected return equal to the riskless return for bearing the risk of devaluation). For 
example, under risk aversion, an 8% interest rate differential could be consistent with a 2% risk 
premium and a 20% chance of a 30% devaluation.  
  While it is not possible to determine the precise combination of (1) the perceived 
probability of devaluation, (2) the percentage devaluation expected to occur if a devaluation does 
occur, and (3) the devaluation risk premium, these three components of the interest rate 
differential tend to be positively related (bad news about fiscal affairs tends to produce increases 
in all three components). Thus, a rising interest rate differential will tend to be the result of 
increases in each of the three components.   
  As Figure 2 shows, the possibility of devaluation, as measured by the deposit interest rate 
differential, increased substantially in the spring of 2001, and then rose dramatically in the late 
summer and fall of 2001. The sovereign risk of Argentina followed a similar pattern, as shown in 
                                                                                                                                                             
market. The perceived possibility of debt redenomination acts to reduce the observed interest rate differential for any 
given probability of devaluation.   7 
Figures 3A and 3B, which use two similar alternative measures of the sovereign yield spread on 
Argentina’s international bonds. The co-movement of the sovereign debt spread and the deposit 
interest rate differential reflects the fact that both sovereign default risk and devaluation risk 
were driven by a common factor, namely an unsustainable fiscal policy.  
  The peso-dollar deposit interest rate differential declined dramatically at the beginning of 
December 2001, just before the January 2002 devaluation. That decline does not reflect a decline 
in the perceived risk of devaluation. Rather, it is an artifact of the so called corralito – the policy 
of restricting the withdrawal of bank deposits, which was accompanied by a dramatic reduction 
in the interest rate paid on 30-day deposits denominated in both dollars and pesos. 
  Another indicator of perceived devaluation risk is capital flight. From June through the 
end of November 2001, as shown in Figure 4, more than $6 billion in dollar-denominated 
deposits were withdrawn from Argentine banks. Similarly, Argentina’s international reserves 
declined dramatically during 2001, as shown in Figure 5. Capital flight was closely associated 
with the corralito, beginning on December 1, 2001. As shown in Figure 6, capital flight was the 
last phase of a contraction in capital inflows that had been gaining momentum since 1999, and 
that had been negative since 2000. 
  As Figures 2-6 clearly show, market sentiment about devaluation risk and government 
default risk varied during 2001. Devaluation and default risk were significant as early as 
December 2000, and remained elevated throughout 2001, but reached very high levels during 
particular weeks and months of 2001 (e.g., March-April, July, and  September-December of 
2001).  
  After the initial devaluation occurred (plotted in Figure 7), and in anticipation of the 
decision to float the currency (which implied the likelihood of a substantial increase in   8 
devaluation), the government chose to redenominate private dollar debts and transportation and 
utility tariffs to alleviate the economic harm that otherwise would have resulted from 
devaluation. On Friday, January 4, 2002, the government announced a plan to end convertibility, 
take steps to provide debt relief to debtors owing dollar-denominated debts, and eliminate the 
legislation that had tied public utility and transportation tariffs to the dollar. Convertibility was 
ended on January 6, 2002, and the executive was empowered to establish a new exchange rate 
system. Some small dollar debts were converted right away into pesos. On February 3, under 
Decree 214/02, all dollar-denominated debts were redenominated in anticipation of floating the 
currency, which occurred on February 11.
5  
  The potential financial harm from devaluation without debt contract redenomination, or 
equivalent measures to reduce the real value of dollar-denominated debts, was a theme of much 
academic research and policy debate in the wake of the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-1995 
and the 1997 Asian financial crises. The Argentine government had observed the consequences 
of devaluation without debt redenomination in Mexico post-1994 and in East Asia post-1997, 
and was keenly aware of the severe adverse consequences of not combining devaluation with 
debt redenomination.  Those consequences included massive financial distress of borrowers, and 
financial gridlock resulting from that inability of firms to repay their debts.  Those concerns 
figured prominently in the discussion of Argentina’s policy options at the time it chose to 
devalue.  Several prominent academics (including Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz) argued that 
devaluation would produce financial distress for borrowers with dollar denominated claims, and 
                                                 
5 Decree 214/2002 can be found within the website of the Ministry of Economy and Production: 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar.  More specifically, Decree 214/2002 can be found at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/txtnorma/72017.htm.   9 
that a redenomination of debts or some other economy-wide plan to reduce the value of dollar-
denominated debt would soften the blow of devaluation.
6   
  It bears emphasis that debt, and transportation and utility tariff, redenomination were 
linked by policy to devaluation.  Dollar debts and transportation and utility tariffs were not 
reduced by a fixed nominal quantity (as in a debt exchange), but rather were redenominated in 
pesos so that any future reductions in the value of the peso would not result in the deterioration 
of borrowers’ abilities to meet debt service obligations, or energy or toll road users’ abilities to 
pay their energy bills or tolls.  Furthermore, recognizing that debt redenomination was not 
necessary with respect to the financing of exports (as argued above), the government limited debt 
redenomination in its Decree 410 of March 1, 2002 by excluding foreign trade finance from 
redenomination.
7 
  Observers and policy makers were also aware of examples that illustrated the possibility 
of macroeconomic improvement via reductions in the real value of debt. A debt exchange that 
effectively reduced the real value of bank debt had been used to help revive Argentine banks 
under the Bonex Plan a decade earlier. Debt redenomination alongside devaluation had been 
                                                 
6 See also Michael Bordo and Roberto Chang, “Throw Away the Dollar Peg,” Financial Times, June 7, 2001. For a 
review of the issues involved in this discussion, see Luis  Felipe Cespedes, Roberto Chang, and Andres Velasco, 
“Balance Sheets and Exchange Rate Policy,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7840, 
2000, and “IS-LM-BP in the Pampas,” IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 50, Special Issue, 2003, pp. 143-56; Charles W. 
Calomiris, Daniela Klingebiel, and Luc Laeven, “A Taxonomy of Financial Crisis Restructuring Mechanisms: 
Cross-Country Experience and Policy Implications,”, in Systemic Financial Distress: Containment and Resolution, 
edited by Patrick Honohan and Luc Laeven, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 25-75; Ricardo Hausmann and 
Andres Velasco, “Hard Money’s Soft Underbelly: Understanding the Argentine Crisis,” in Brookings Trade Forum: 
2002, edited by Susan M. Collins and Dani Rodrik; Aaron Tornell, “Policy in an Economy with Balance Sheet 
Effects,” in Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, edited by Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey A. Frankel, 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 705-40; Sebastian Edwards, Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and 
Adjustment, MIT Press, 1989; and Paul Krugman and Lance Taylor, “Contractionary Effects of Devaluation,” 
Journal of International Economics 8, 1978, pp. 445-56.  
7 Decree 410/2002 can be found within the website of the Ministry of Economy and Production: 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar.  More specifically, Decree 410/2002 can be found at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/txtnorma/72761.htm. It is important to note that, while foreign trade finance, and foreign 
debts enforced outside Argentina, were not pesified, pesification still had substantial benefits for exporters to the 
extent that they had borrowed domestically in dollars for purposes other than trade finance.  10 
used to great effect by the United States when it redenominated private sector gold-denominated 
debts into dollar-denominated debts in 1933.  A study by Professor Randall Kroszner, arguing 
for the salutary effects of that policy choice, was widely circulated before the Argentine crisis.
8 
Professor Kroszner was also a member of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers at the 
time of the Argentine crisis. Mexico had pursued a similar debt-relief policy of reducing the 
dollar value of its dollar-denominated bank loans and dollar-denominated deposits in 1982.
9  
  One aspect of Argentina’s redenomination policy that is outside of the scope of this study 
is worthy of comment, namely “asymmetric pesification” of bank loans and deposits. While bank 
loans were subject to redenomination at face value into pesos (and therefore depreciated in dollar 
terms fully by the amount of exchange rate devaluation), dollar-denominated deposits were 
converted into pesos at a higher peso value. This policy was an attempt to placate depositors, 
who complained of the loss of value of their bank deposits. Asymmetric pesification implied a 
substantial loss to banks, since their liabilities were depreciated in value much less than their 
assets. To compensate banks for that loss, the government issued bonds to the banks which 
replaced the lost value from asymmetric pesification. Thus, citizens qua taxpayers paid for the 
cost of the relative subsidy received by citizens qua depositors. Asymmetric pesification seems 
to have had little real effects on banks (or their borrowers) and seems best described as a 
                                                 
8 See Randall Kroszner, “Is It Better to Forgive than to Receive?  Repudiation of the Gold Indexation Clause in 
Long-Term Debt During the Great Depression,” University of Chicago, Working Paper, November 1999. 
9 Liliana Rojas-Suarez and Steven R. Weisbrod, Financial Fragilities in Latin America: The 1980s and 1990s, IMF 
Occasional Paper 132, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, October 1995, pp. 17-18. This article 
describes how partial redenomination of bank loans and deposits in Mexico was used to shift some of the burden for 
the bailout of bank borrowers (via loan redenomination) onto bank depositors (via deposit redenomination): “…the 
government engaged in a policy of reducing the real burden of borrower debt and forcing depositors to absorb some 
of these losses through a reduction in the real value of deposits. The latter action was achieved through a 
combination of policies: forced conversion of foreign currency-denominated deposits at unfavorable exchange rates 
and negative real interest rates on peso-denominated deposits. The real value of loans was reduced through the 
conversion of foreign currency loans to pesos at an exchange rate that overstated the value of the peso relative to the 
dollar.”  11 
politically expedient way to impose losses on consumers by postponing taxation and making it 
less visible. 
 
  Argentina’s Vulnerability to Devaluation 
  The appeal of redenomination of dollar debts as part of a devaluation policy reflected the 
fact that the Argentine financial system was one of the most dollarized financial systems in the 
world on the eve of the Argentine devaluation. Based on an overall financial system dollarization 
score, derived by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Argentina was the fourth most 
dollarized financial system (outside the United States) in the world during the period 1996-2001. 
Table 1 reports data for the 16 countries identified by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) as 
having the highest dollarization scores.  
  The Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano score (which takes into account the fraction of 
dollarized deposits, dollar-denominated bonds and external public sector debt) does not fully 
capture the peculiar vulnerability of Argentine debtors to devaluation (in the absence of dollar 
debt redenomination). To capture the vulnerability of Argentine private sector borrowers on the 
eve of devaluation, I construct an alternative measure, based entirely on private borrowing 
denominated in dollars (relative to total private debt). This measure (corporate debt denominated 
in dollars – or, CDDD – relative to total domestic private debt), is reported in Table 1 alongside 
the Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano dollarization score, and is plotted for the 50 countries 
identified by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano as having “highest” or “high” dollarization scores 
in Figure 8D.  
  Table 1 and Figures 8C and 8D show that the dollarization score and the CDDD ratio 
imply somewhat different rankings of countries. According to the CDDD ratio, Argentine private  12 
sector debt was much more heavily dollarized than those of the other four countries with similar 
or higher Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano dollarization scores (Bolivia, Bulgaria, Ecuador, and 
Uruguay).  
  But neither the dollarization score nor the CDDD ratio, by itself, can capture a country’s 
debtors’ vulnerability to devaluation. First, as discussed in Section IV below, other dollar-
denominated or dollar-indexed contracts (i.e., utility tariffs) may add to financial distress in the 
wake of a devaluation. Furthermore, to the extent that a country’s dollar-denominated debt 
service can be paid by export revenues, borrowers can be insulated from the effects of 
devaluation. Exporters earn dollar-denominated revenues in external markets, and so are 
insulated from declines in the domestic demand for their products. That ability to maintain dollar 
revenues during a devaluation enables tradables producers to continue to service dollar-
denominated debt, even after a devaluation.  Indeed, the decline in the dollar value of labor and 
occupancy expenses as the result of devaluation can result in a net advantage to exporters from 
devaluation, despite high dollar-denominated debt. In contrast, non-exporting firms’ revenues do 
not provide a revenue offset against rising real debt service costs.  
  Thus, in a highly dollarized country with a small fraction of exports to GDP, devaluation 
without debt redenomination would have a particularly negative effect on domestic borrowers. In 
addition, as discussed in Section IV below, a proper measure of a country’s financial 
vulnerability to a devaluation should also take into account the existence of factors such as 
dollar-indexed transportation and utility concession contracts. 
  Table 1 and Figures 8A-8D show that Argentina was in a peculiarly vulnerable position 
from the standpoint of that combined measure of financial vulnerability (the combination of its 
export-to-GDP ratio and either measure of financial dollarization). There are countries listed in  13 
Table 1, and plotted in Figures 8A, 8B, 8C, and 8D, that have a higher CDDD ratio or 
dollarization score than Argentina’s (Angola, Mozambique, and São Tomé & Príncipe, for 
example, have higher CDDD ratios than Argentina; Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay have higher 
dollarization scores), but those countries all have substantially higher export-to-GDP ratios than 
Argentina. Argentina had the lowest export-to-GDP ratio of the highly dollarized economies 
shown in Table 1, and ranked fourth and sixth with respect to its financial dollarization (using 
the Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano score, or the CDDD ratio, respectively).  Clearly, Argentina 
was one of the most vulnerable economies, if not the most vulnerable economy, in the world to 
the financial and macroeconomic consequences of devaluation (if it were pursued without the 
redenomination of debts).  
 
III. Effects of Debt Redenomination 
  I now turn to the questions of whether devaluation with debt redenomination had salutary 
effects on the investment behavior of debtor firms, and whether redenomination was a positive 
surprise at the time it was enacted. To test whether devaluation with debt redenomination 
substantially increased the investments of Argentine firms, and whether the announcement of 
this policy was a positive surprise to the market, I undertook two empirical analyses.   
  The first is an analysis of the investment behavior of firms, which measures the extent to 
which debt redenomination improved the ability of Argentine firms, and especially non-tradables 
firms, to invest in plant, property and equipment during the two years after devaluation. This 
study contrasts the relatively favorable experience of non-tradables producers with high 
preexisting levels of dollar-denominated debt in Argentina after its devaluation with the 
experience of high-dollar-debt non-tradables producers in Mexico after its devaluation.   14 
  By using a “difference in difference” empirical approach – that is, contrasting the lack of 
a difference in investment behavior between non-tradables high-dollar debtors, and tradables 
high-dollar debtors, in Argentina, with the substantially lower investment spending of non-
tradables high-dollar debtors relative to tradables high-dollar debtors in Mexico – I am able to 
control not only for differences in the effects of devaluation on firms’ revenues, but also for 
selectivity bias in firms’ decisions to issue dollar-denominated debts. In particular, it non-
tradables producers that issue dollar-denominated debt may have some superior characteristics 
relative to other non-tradables producers ex ante (at the time of their debt offerings) that help to 
explain their willingness to issue dollar-denominated debt despite its risks. Indeed, below I 
describe some evidence from ex post performance that supports that view. This selectivity bias 
will tend to understate the effects of debt deflation shocks. Comparing the performance of 
Argentine and Mexican non-tradables firms with high dollar debt controls somewhat for that 
selectivity bias, since selectivity bias should apply to both Argentine and Mexican non-tradables 
firms with high dollar debt. 
  The second part of the analysis examines the Argentine stock market’s reactions to the 
debt redenomination announcement of February 3, 2002, to determine whether redenomination 
policy was a surprise and whether the market viewed redenomination as improving the condition 
of Argentine firms – in particular, whether redenomination was associated with an improvement 
in the market’s view of the prospects of Argentine firms with high preexisting levels of dollar-
denominated debt. This event study finds that the announcement of debt redenomination was 
beneficial and not fully anticipated. The announcement was associated with a positive stock 
market reaction, on average, and with an especially favorable reaction with respect to the 
prospects of high-dollar-debt producers.   15 
  Both empirical analyses provide support for the view that the combination of devaluation 
and redenomination of debt in Argentina was a beneficial short-term macroeconomic policy 
compared to devaluation without the redenomination of debt. The fact that high-dollar-debt non-
tradables producers benefited the most from redenomination is consistent with the theory of 
investment under imperfect capital markets, discussed at length above, which implies that they 
would have been among the most vulnerable to a devaluation without redenomination. Given 
Argentina’s low proportion of exports and high levels of dollarized debts (shown above in Table 
1, and in Figures 8A-8D), the improvement in the performance of high-dollar-debt non-tradables 
producers likely was of substantial importance to the Argentine recovery from the crisis. 
 
  A Comparison of Investment Behavior after the Argentine and Mexican Crises 
  The effect of financial distress on a firm’s economic performance is revealed through that 
firm’s investment decisions. Fixed capital investment is clearly a decision variable of the firm, 
one that is highly dependent on the availability of financing. Firms that are in financial distress, 
or even those not in distress that have suffered substantial declines in net worth value as the 
result of an increase in the value of their debts relative to their assets, will suffer higher costs of 
financing investment, and consequently may shrink investment spending dramatically.
10 
  I compare the investment behavior of firms in Mexico and Argentina in the wake of their 
devaluations of December 1994-1995 and early 2002, respectively, which are plotted in Figures 
7 and 9.  I consider differences in firms’ investment behavior during periods one and two years 
after devaluation, and relate those investment behavior differences to the sector in which the 
                                                 
10 See Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler, “Financial Fragility and Economic Performance,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 104, 1989, pp. 878-104; Steve Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce Petersen, “Financing Constraints 
and Corporate Investment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 1, 1988, pp. 141-95; and Charles W. Calomiris 
and R. Glenn Hubbard, “Internal Finance and Investment: Evidence from the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-37,” 
Journal of Business, 68, 1995, pp. 443-82.  16 
firms operate (tradable or non-tradable) and to the firms’ reliance on dollar-denominated debt. 
Behavioral differences are gauged relative to a simple neoclassical benchmark “accelerator” 
model, in which investment is a function of sales. As discussed above at length, firms in the non-
tradables sector with a heavy reliance on dollar debt will be the most vulnerable to a devaluation 
without a debt redenomination (the policy choice of Mexico in 1994-95).  Non-tradables firms 
with high dollar debt should demonstrate the greatest reductions in investment, both because 
their sales growth will be relatively lower after a devaluation, and because their ability to access 
external finance will be adversely affected by their deteriorating financial condition. Non-
tradables producers that have issued less dollar-denominated debt (in Mexico) will experience 
less deterioration in their financial condition, and thus, less of a decline in their investment. The 
effect of dollar-denominated debt should be less apparent in the investment behavior of 
Argentine non-tradables firms with high dollar-denominated debt, since their debts were 
redenominated. Thus, in theory, one would expect to observe the following three phenomena 
from a comparative study of Mexican and Argentine firms’ investment behavior after their 
respective devaluations: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In both countries, firms in the tradables sector, ceteris paribus, should 
exhibit higher investment growth after a devaluation relative to non-tradables producers, 
since in comparison to non-tradables producers, devaluation reduces their revenues less 
and affects their financing costs less. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Non-tradables firms with high dollar debt, ceteris paribus, should exhibit 
lower investment spending in Mexico, compared to low-dollar debt, non-tradables firms 
in Mexico, in the wake of devaluation, since devaluation increases the effective debt 
burden for high-dollar debt, non-tradables producers. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Non-tradables firms with high dollar debt, ceteris paribus, should not 
exhibit inferior performance in Argentina, compared to low-dollar debt, non-tradables 
firms in Argentina, since debt redenomination removed the effect of an increased debt 
burden for high-dollar debt, non-tradables borrowers as the result of devaluation. 
  17 
  Table 2 describes the variables used in the study and defines them. Table 3 investigates 
the three hypotheses from the perspective of raw data on investment expenditures in the first year 
after a devaluation (as a proportion of the firm’s total plant, property and equipment at the end of 
the prior year). Table 4 is identical to Table 3 but considers the two-year period after a 
devaluation. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed by Tables 3 and 4. Tradables producers in both Mexico 
and Argentina tend to invest more after devaluation than non-tradables producers. To be specific, 
in Argentina, both high-dollar-debt and low-dollar-debt tradables firms invest more after 
devaluation than firms with similar dollar debt ratios operating in the non-tradables sector, and 
those differences are statistically significant. For example, high-dollar-debt tradables producers 
in Argentina had investment ratios of 0.18 in the two years after devaluation (shown in Table 4), 
while high-dollar-debt non-tradables producers in Argentina displayed investment ratios of only 
0.07.  The difference between non-tradables and tradables, which is shown in Table 4 as -0.1092, 
is significant at the 7.8% significance level. In Mexico, the difference between tradables and 
non-tradables firms is also positive and statistically significant for high-dollar-debt firms, but 
there is no significant difference across the two sectors within the category of low-dollar-debt 
firms (and the sign of the effect is reversed).  
  Hypotheses 2 and 3 are also confirmed in Tables 3 and 4.  With respect to Hypothesis 2, 
in Mexico, high-dollar-debt non-tradables producers display much lower investment rates than 
low-dollar-debt non-tradables producers. The differences are large, statistically significant, and 
persistent (they grow in magnitude during the second year after devaluation). With respect to 
Hypothesis 3, in Argentina, there is no difference among non-tradables producers related to the 
presence of dollar-denominated debt. Within the category of non-tradables producers, high- 18 
dollar-debt and low-dollar-debt firms behave similarly (particularly in the two-year window 
results in Table 4) and are not statistically significantly different.  
  By way of providing additional background on the determinants of investment, Tables 5-
8 report data on sales and earnings before interest cost, taxes, depreciation or amortization 
(EBITDA), broken down into the same categories as in Tables 3 and 4. While these revenues and 
earnings measures are certainly not independent of financial distress effects, they are measured 
before taking into account the effects of debt service costs on net earnings. Tables 5 and 6 
provide evidence on sales revenue growth and Tables 7 and 8 provide data on earnings 
(EBITDA) relative to assets. The patterns of difference between tradables and non-tradables 
producers are similar to those shown in the investment tables. Tradables producers have superior 
sales and earnings growth to non-tradables producers after devaluation.   
  One interesting finding is that in both Mexico and Argentina, high-dollar-debt firms 
(within either sector) tend to have higher revenue growth than low-dollar-debt firms after 
devaluation. In other words, in Mexico, high-dollar-debt non-tradables firms had lower 
investment growth than low-dollar-debt non-tradables firms despite the fact that their revenue 
growth was higher, indicating a very potent effect of dollar-denominated debt in depressing 
investment rates for non-tradables producers in Mexico. The higher revenue growth of high-
dollar-debt firms reflects selection bias; firms with better prospects for growth and earnings tend 
to be the ones that qualified for access to dollar-denominated debt in the past.
11 
  Tables 9 and 10 provide an additional analysis of Hypotheses 2 and 3, using a multiple 
regression framework.  Those Hypotheses predict the presence (in Mexico) and absence (in 
Argentina) of a high-dollar-debt effect for non-tradables producers, ceteris paribus. Tables 9 and 
                                                 
11 See Sanket Mohapatra, “Exchange Rate Regimes and Corporate Borrowing from International Capital Markets," 
Working Paper, Columbia University, February 2004.  19 
10 perform a ceteris paribus comparison by controlling for differences in sales growth or prior 
rates of investment (pre-devaluation) at the firm level, for firms in Mexico and Argentina, pre-  
and post-devaluation.  Table 9 reports cross-sectional regression results for two specifications for 
one-year period comparisons, and Table 10 reports similar regressions for two-year periods. The 
two regression specifications within each table differ by either including or excluding interactive 
indicator variables that allow the interaction of the sector (tradable or non-tradable) and the 
dollar debt level, and that also interact the product of those variables with the country indicator 
(ARG).  
  Tables 9 and 10 do not provide tests of Hypothesis 1.  Note that the main effect of 
devaluation on the relative performance of tradable producers is their relative growth in dollar-
denominated revenues.  Since revenue growth is included in the regression, and is thus 
controlled for, there is little residual explanatory role for the TR indicator variable in the 
regressions. The fact that the TR indicator variable has a weak, and sometimes negative, effect 
on investment in the regressions, does not imply a rejection of Hypothesis 1; it simply implies 
that, once one controls for differences in dollar-denominated revenue growth, there is little else 
about tradables producers, per se, that boosts their investment rates (although, the net effect of 
the TR indicator is positive, and often statistically significant, for Argentina – that is, the sum of 
the TR and TRxARG coefficients is positive, and the TRxARG coefficient is often statistically 
significant). 
  Tables 9 and 10 provide tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3.  With respect to Hypothesis 2, the 
predictions are that the coefficient on DDA is negative (reflecting the negative effect of higher 
dollar debt in Mexico for non-tradable producers), and that the coefficient on TRxDDA is 
offsetting and positive (reflecting the mitigation of the negative effect of dollar debt that comes  20 
from being an exporter).  These predictions are supported by the regression results; the 
coefficients are of the right sign and large, although the levels of statistical significance are not 
always high, owing to the limited sample size. With respect to Hypothesis 3, the predictions are 
that the interactions of the DDA and TRxDDA with the ARG indicator should be opposite to 
those of DDA and TRxDDA.  In other words, DDAxARG should be positive (reflecting that the 
negative effect of higher dollar debt that is present in Mexico is absent in Argentina), and 
TRxDDAxARG should be negative (reflecting the fact that the relative advantage tradable firms 
have in avoiding the special burden of dollar debt is also absent in Argentina).  These predictions 
are similarly confirmed. 
  In summary, an investigation of the investment behavior of firms in Mexico and 
Argentina, one or two years after their countries’ respective devaluations, finds that the predicted 
effects of devaluation with and without debt redenomination are upheld in the data. In Mexico, 
where devaluation was not accompanied by dollar debt redenomination, investment was reduced 
as the result of increased debt burdens for firms with high dollar debt, and this burden was borne 
primarily by non-tradable firms. In Argentina, where devaluation was accompanied by the 
redenomination of private dollar-denominated debts, these effects on investment were not 
apparent. 
 
  An Event Study of the Announcement of Debt Redenomination 
  Having shown that redenomination seems to have improved the financial condition and 
investment performance of Argentine firms, I ask whether the market anticipated that 
improvement.  The purpose of this event study is to see whether the salutary effects of  21 
redenomination were anticipated in advance, and whether they were understood widely at the 
time the policy was announced.   
  The event study measures whether the stock market in Argentina reacted favorably to the 
announcement, overall, and also whether the abnormal returns of firms that were most likely to 
benefit from redenomination policy (those with high dollar debt, and those producing in the non-
tradable sector) enjoyed the largest relative returns in reaction to the announcement. In Tables 11 
and 12, I present results for an event study of redenomination using both raw returns and 
abnormal returns (returns measured after removing the effects of overall market returns on the 
returns of individual firms).  The results for raw returns are useful for gauging the overall 
macroeconomic effect of the announcement of redenomination.  Both the raw and abnormal 
returns results are useful for gauging cross-sectional differences. 
  While there had been an announced intention to redenominate some dollar debts on 
January 4, and small dollar debts had been redenominated in the first week in January, it was not 
until later that the government decided to redenominate all dollar debts into pesos. On February 
3, all dollar-denominated debts were redenominated in anticipation of floating the currency, 
which occurred on February 11. Given the ambiguities about redenomination of debt in early 
January, and the absence of any trading days in the stock market between January 4 and January 
17, I chose January 30, 2002 to February 7, 2002 as the event window for debt redenomination. 
The details of the method for calculating raw and abnormal returns are provided in the notes to 
Table 11. 
  Table 11 divides Argentine publicly traded firms into four categories, divided by the level 
of their dollar debt (high or low) and by whether they are in tradables or non-tradables sectors. 
The raw and abnormal returns are positive for all four categories of firms during the event  22 
window, indicating a substantial positive returns for each group, which ranges from 1.6% for 
low-dollar-debt non-tradable firms to 27.6% for high-dollar-debt tradable firms.   
  The differences in Table 11 between high-dollar-debt firms and low-dollar-debt firms in 
each sector are large and statistically significant, indicating that firms with large amounts of 
dollar-denominated debt enjoyed much higher raw and abnormal returns during the event 
window.  This confirms that redenomination was not fully anticipated, and that the market 
perceived that redenomination would particularly improve the performance of firms with large 
amounts of dollar debt.   
  Interestingly, however, within each debt category, tradable producers show substantially 
higher returns than non-tradable producers.  This result seems to contradict economic theory and 
the empirical results of our investment study above. Shouldn’t high-debt non-tradable producers 
have been expected to receive a greater advantage from redenomination than high-debt tradable 
firms, since in the event, they actually do seem to have been relatively advantaged by 
redenomination? 
  There are two simple potential explanations for the relatively positive effect on tradable 
producers’ returns during the redenomination event window.  First, redenomination was 
understood at the time to be a preamble to floating the currency.  Having redenominated 
transportation and utility tariffs and dollar debts, the government was much more likely to float, 
and much more likely to permit a substantial devaluation, since the major macroeconomic cost of 
a large devaluation had been removed by the redenomination of debt contracts.  Thus, one of the 
pieces of “news” embedded in the redenomination announcements was the likelihood of a much 
greater devaluation than had been previously expected.  Obviously, news of a much higher 
devaluation than previously expected would benefit tradable producers. Thus, any interpretation  23 
of the cross-section of returns during the redenomination event window is complicated by the 
fact that redenomination was news about two things: On the one hand, it was news about tariff 
and debt relief, which was most advantageous to high-dollar-debt firms, and to high-dollar-debt 
non-tradable firms, in particular. On the other hand, it was news about the likelihood of a large 
devaluation, which advantaged tradable firms.  This may explain why the cross-section of returns 
shown in Table 11 shows high relative returns for firms with high debt, and also high relative 
returns for tradable firms.  In other words, even if redenomination, per se, was understood to be 
relatively advantageous to non-tradable firms with high dollar debt, there was more to the 
redenomination announcements than redenomination per se.   
  A second possible interpretation revolves around the effects of the February debt 
redenomination announcement on the fortunes of utility producers. A large proportion of non-
tradables firms were utilities, and many of them were affected adversely by the redenomination 
of utility tariffs, which had been part of the earlier redenomination announcement in the first 
week in January 2002. It is possible that the decision to broadly redenominate dollar debt in 
February was interpreted as a signal of a declining possibility that the government would 
renegotiate utility tariffs to increase their real amount (as many utility industry representatives 
hoped). According to that interpretation, the February redenomination announcement may have 
been bad news for utility companies. This possibility in more detail in Section IV below. 
  Table 12 provides regression results for the cross-sections of raw and abnormal returns, 
which confirm the results of Table 11. The higher the dollar debt ratio, the bigger the positive 
effect on returns during the redenomination window.  Holding the level of debt constant, tradable 
firms experienced higher returns during the event window. 
  24 
IV. Redenomination of Utility Contracts 
  Consequences of Utility Tariff Redenomination 
  Thus far, this study has explored only the effects of devaluation and debt redenomination 
policies on firms. The redenomination of Argentine utility contracts is another potentially 
important dimension through which redenomination policy affected macroeconomic 
performance, and cross-sectional differences in investment and stock market returns.  
  Not only did market participants perceive a significant risk of collapse as early as 2000, 
they recognized the possibility of redenomination of contracts as part of the government 
response to that collapse.  The potential redenomination of dollar-indexed transportation and 
energy tariffs and dollar debts was discussed frequently as a policy to accompany devaluation, as 
a means of promoting macroeconomic improvement.
12 Indeed, many observers favored 
reductions in the real costs of energy and transport tariffs from an early date. As early as April 
2000, an influential market analyst and the Minister of the Economy were openly suggesting that 
it would be desirable to renegotiate transport and utility contracts as a means to improve 
Argentine macroeconomic performance: 
 
Argentina is “bogged down” on several fronts, according to the influential 
analyst [Miguel Angel Broda]. The currency board, which pegs the peso to 
the dollar, and the fact that 85 percent of the foreign debt was incurred in 
dollars prevent Argentina from resorting to a devaluation to lower costs, 
he pointed out. 
 
That means the costs in dollars are very high,” said Broda, who like 
[Minister of the Economy] Machinea stressed the need to reduce transport 
costs and utility rates by renegotiating the contracts under which 
companies were privatized.
13 
                                                 
12 The Argentine economy continued to contract in 2000 and 2001.  During 2000, real GDP growth was -0.8%.  
During 2001, growth in the first two quarters of the year (relative to the same quarters of the previous year) was  
-2.0% and -0.2%, respectively.  In the third and fourth quarters, the decline in GDP accelerated, and the growth in 
real GDP for the 2001 year as a whole was -0.4%.   
13 “Economy – Argentina: On the Mend, Albeit Slowly, Say Officials”, Inter Press Service, April 6, 2000.  25 
 
Similarly, in its October 7, 2000 issue, The Economist noted that: 
 
Businessmen complain that they are hurt by the high tariffs charged by 
privatized utilities. Next month, the government is throwing open the 
telecoms market, which should cut tariffs, but it argues that in gas and 
electricity industries its hands are tied by long-term contracts. Not so, 
argues Eduardo Basualdo, an economist: the Menem government was 




  Economists, policy makers, and market participants inside and outside Argentina 
perceived a high risk of a financial crisis and saw high tariffs as a significant drag on the 
economy as early as the Spring of 2000. Market participants knew that devaluation without 
redenomination would have substantially increased already high real costs of transportation, 
energy, and debt service. 
  Firms and consumers, in general (other than the affected utilities and toll road suppliers) 
should have benefited (at least in the short term) from the elimination of dollar indexation of 
transportation and utility tariffs. But some firms and consumers should have benefited more than 
others.  In particular: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that are heavy users of energy as an input to production, ceteris 
paribus, should have seen the largest benefits from tariff redenomination. In contrast, 
utilities suppliers whose tariffs were redenominated may have suffered from the policy.
15 
 
  A Comparison of Investment after the Argentine and Mexican Crises 
  To investigate that hypothesis, I first added two new indicator variables to the previous 
regression analysis of investment for post-crisis years in Argentina and Mexico, and to the 
analysis of the cross-section of Argentine stock returns. First, the variable “utility” is an indicator 
                                                 
14 “Another President Caught in Argentina’s Economic Trap,” The Economist, October 7, 2000. 
15 I say “may have suffered” because it is conceivable that utility companies did not suffer, on net, from 
redenomination policy, since tariff redenomination increased quantities demanded (by lowering prices) and also 
increased the likelihood of the payment of utility bills that otherwise may not have been paid at all as the result of 
their high cost (especially in the volatile political environment of Argentina in 2002).  26 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is an Argentine utility producer affected by the 
redenomination of tariffs in 2002, and otherwise takes the value 0. All of the firms in Table 13 
are included in the investment regression analysis, but only some are included in the event 
studies. A list of the firms is provided in Table 13. Second, the variable “high energy” captures 
whether an Argentine firm is in an industry that is an intensive user of energy. I define a firm as 
a high-energy consumer if its 3-digit NAICS code is 322 (Paper), 324 (Petroleum & Coal 
Products), 325 (Chemicals), or 331 (Primary Metals). These four industries were the top 
manufacturing consumers of energy in 1998 in the United States, according to the U.S. 
Department of Energy. To my knowledge, comparable information is not available at the sector 
level in Argentina. 
  The results (which are modified versions of Tables 9 and 10) are reported in Tables 14 
and 15. Coefficient estimates for most variables in Tables 9 and 10 are quite similar to those in 
Tables 14 and 15. The utility indicator coefficient is negative in all specifications, but the effects 
are not statistically significant. The high-energy indicator coefficient is positive in the one-year 
specification, and significant at the ten percent level, but in the two-year specification, the 
coefficient is negative, small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant. These results suggest 
that utility tariff changes had little adverse effect on investment by utility suppliers (during our 
sample period), but large, positive short-term effects on investment by high energy users. The 
fact that this effect is not present over the two-year post-crisis window may indicate that the 
positive effects from tariff redenomination reflected the elimination of the perceived risk of a 
sharp rise in the real cost of energy for high energy users, rather than a long-term motivation to 
expand investment relative to sales.   27 
  The absence of a long-run positive effect on investment relative to sales for high-energy 
firms in this regression, relative to other firms, should not be misconstrued to imply that the 
stabilizing effects of tariff redenomination for investment in the year immediately after the crisis 
were unimportant in the long run. In the counterfactual world of no tariff redenomination, 
financial distress could have resulted for many high-energy consuming firms, and that would 
have had significantly negative long-run effects on investment by those firms, and on the 
economy generally. In other words, the regression coefficient measures the effect of tariff 
redenomination relative to an implicit benchmark of no change in real tariff costs. In fact, in the 
absence of tariff redenomination, real tariff costs would have more than tripled. Thus, a zero 
long-run effect (relative to other firms) may reflect a large positive long-run outcome when 
properly compared to the counterfactual of what otherwise would have resulted from the tripling 
of real energy costs and the reductions in investment by high-energy firms that would have been 
a consequence of that cost increase.  
  One possible explanation for the lack of an observed negative effect on utility suppliers is 
that reductions in real energy costs increased demand and reduced default risk (by improving the 
ability of consumers and firms to pay their bills).  
 
  Event Studies of the Announcements of Redenominations 
  Tariff redenomination occurred in the first week in January, long before the 
redenomination of all dollar-denominated debts in early February. Thus, I consider two separate 
event studies of announcement effects. The first event window is designed to address the effect 
of the initial announcement of utility tariff redenomination. This event window examines stock 
returns over the period January 2 to January 18. January 2 is two days before the government’s  28 
January 4 announcement; January 17 is the first day in which trading occurred after the 
announcement. The second event study is designed to explore the potential effects of debt 
redenomination policy on expectations about tariff renegotiation (on the theory that debt 
redenomination may have been viewed as a negative signal about the government’s political 
propensity for utility tariff renegotiation). It examines the same time frame as Table 12 above 
(January 30-February 7).  
  Results for the two event study windows are presented in Tables 16 and 17.  The average 
raw returns in the first event window were 26.4 percent, indicating that the policy announcement 
was seen as favorable for the sample of firms, overall. For the first event window (Table 16), 
coefficient signs are consistent with expectations, and are quite large, but the standard errors are 
even larger. With the exception of the tradables indicator (reflecting the importance of the 
devaluation aspect of the announcement), none of the other coefficients is statistically 
significant. While the results are consistent with expectations, the sample size is not large enough 
to offer conclusive evidence on the effects of tariff changes on the stock returns of suppliers and 
high-energy users. 
  For the second event window (Table 17), the high-energy indicator is positive, large, and 
somewhat statistically significant. The utility indicator is negative, large, and statistically 
insignificant. These results lend some credence, but not conclusive evidence, in support of the 
hypothesis that the February debt redenomination decree was perceived as a signal of political 
propensities that implied a reduced chance that the government would renegotiate to raise tariff 
rates in the near future (which, in the event, the government was unwilling to do). Overall, the 
event study results indicate that the market perceived redenomination policy changes as positive  29 
for companies that were heavy users of energy, after controlling for other firm attributes (i.e., 
indicators for dollar debt and tradables). 
 
V. Conclusion 
  This study offers the first empirical microeconomic analysis of the effectiveness of dollar 
debt and contract redenomination policies to mitigate adverse financial and relative price 
consequences from a large devaluation. An analysis of Argentina’s policy of devaluation with 
redenomination in 2002, in contrast to Mexico’s policy of devaluation without debt 
redenomination in 1994-1995, shows that devaluation benefited tradables firms, and that dollar 
debt redenomination in Argentina benefited high-dollar debtors, as shown in these firms’ 
investment behavior, especially non-tradables firms whose revenues in dollar terms were 
adversely affected by devaluation. That investment behavior contrasts with the experience of 
Mexican firms in the aftermath of Mexico’s large devaluation, in which non-tradables producers 
with high dollar debt displayed significant relative reductions in investment. Stock return 
reactions to Argentine debt redenomination indicate large, positive, unanticipated effects on 
high-dollar debtors from debt redenomination. Energy concession contract redenomination 
likewise increased investment by high energy users in Argentina, and that benefit was apparent 
also in positive stock returns of those firms. 
  This evidence for short-term macroeconomic benefits from redenomination, however, 
does not necessarily imply that redenomination policy in Argentina was socially beneficial, on 
net, nor does it imply that Argentina’s policy should be imitated by other countries facing a need 
to devalue. When government interferes with preexisting contracts it may damage the reliability 
of contracting agreements made in the future. The adverse reputational consequences to a  30 
government from redenomination, therefore, must be considered alongside the short-term gains 
from redenomination. Clearly, redenomination policy should not be used frequently as a 
countercyclical measure, since doing so would have little short-term benefit (few contracts 
would exist to be redenominated) and would eliminate the use of beneficial dollar contracting, 
which can be helpful in spurring investment in emerging market countries by limiting the 
devaluation risks borne by creditors or investors in privatized utility companies.  
To the extent that redenomination policy leads market participants to expect future ex 
post changes in contract enforcement, it could be particularly damaging to the economy. Thus, 
when redenomination policy is employed, it should be accompanied by other policies and 
credible signals that indicate that its use is exceptional. For example, in Argentina, having 
redenominated utility contracts into pesos, the government should have moved quickly to 
renegotiate utility tariffs on a fair basis. If it had done so, that would have substantially mitigated 
reputational consequences of pesification policy.  
  Despite the reputational costs of redenomination policy, however, it is likely to be 
beneficial for some circumstances in some contexts. In the presence of a large devaluation in a 
highly dollarized financial system, the alternatives to the redenomination of dollar debts for 
emerging market countries are frequently very unattractive policies, including (a) the economy-
wide litigation of creditors’ claims on bankrupt borrowers through the legal system, (b) the 
establishment of government-run asset management companies to dispose of distressed assets, or 
(c) government subsidies to banks and borrowers to permit them to resolve otherwise unpayable 
debts. As Calomiris, Klingebiel and Laeven (2005) show in a analysis of various cases of 
financial crises, emerging market countries suffer from weak legal systems and corrupt political  31 
environments, which make solutions of type (a) and (b) particularly unattractive.
16 And the large 
moral-hazard costs associated with bailouts, and their undesirable effects on government 
finances, make solutions of type (c) problematic, as well. Despite the reputational costs of 
redenomination, compared to available alternatives, in some cases it may offer the speediest and 
least costly method of resolving the financial distress and macroeconomic decline that results 
from devaluation in a highly dollarized economy. 
                                                 
16 Charles W. Calomiris, Daniela Klingebiel, and Luc Laeven, “A Taxonomy of Financial Crisis Restructuring 
Mechanisms: Cross-Country Experience and Policy Implications,”, in Systemic Financial Distress: Containment 
and Resolution, edited by Patrick Honohan and Luc Laeven, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 25-75.  32 
 
Figure 1: Argentine Quarterly GDP, 1999-2005 
Quarterly GDP (Real 1993 Prices): 1999Q1-2005Q3



















































































































































































































































































Sources: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; Banco Central de la República Argentina, Interest Rates on Deposits 
(available at http://www.bcra.gov.ar/).  34 
Figure 3A: Difference Between Interest Rates on 30-Day Time Deposits in Argentina in Pesos 


























































































































































Weekly Interest Rate Difference
Daily EMBI+ Argentina Strip Spread
 
Sources: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; Banco Central de la República Argentina, Interest Rates on Deposits 
(available at http://www.bcra.gov.ar/).  35 
 
Figure 3B: Difference Between Interest Rates on 30-Day Time Deposits in Argentina in Pesos 





































































































































































Weekly Interest Rate Difference
Daily EMBI+ Argentina Spread Over Treasury
 
Sources: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.; Banco Central de la República Argentina, Interest Rates on Deposits 
(available at http://www.bcra.gov.ar/). 
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Source: Argentina Ministry of Economy & Production, Macroeconomic Statistics (available at 
http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html).  37 
































































































Note: Because of a change in the BCRA’s definition of international reserves, data after October 31, 2001 
includes public bonds involved in reverse repo-operations. Data before October 31 does not include these 
bonds. 
Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina, International Reserves and BCRA’s Financial Liabilities 
(available at http://www.bcra.gov.ar/).  38 






















































































Note: Equity inflow was not available until 1992. I use the following variables from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics as components of capital inflows: 
1) FDI: line 78bed (Direct Investment in the Reporting Economy, n.i.e.) 
2) Equity: line 78bmd (Equity Securities Liabilities) 
3) Debt: line 78bnd (Debt Securities Liabilities). 
4) Other: line 78bid (Other Investment Liabilities, n.i.e.) 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, June 2004.  39 
Figure 7: Argentina’s Nominal Exchange Rate 
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Figure 8A: Reinhart-Rogoff-Savastano Composite Dollarization Index Level vs. 
Exports-to-GDP Ratio for Reinhart-Rogoff-Savastano’s  
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Sources: Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, & Miguel A. Savastano, Addicted to Dollars, NBER 
Working Paper 10015, October 2003, at Table 4; World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
(available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/).  41 
Figure 8B: CDDD-to-Private Credit Ratio vs. Exports-to-GDP Ratio for  
Reinhart-Rogoff-Savastano’s Five Highest Dollarized Countries 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2002); World Bank, 
World Development Indicators Database (available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/); Bank for 
International Settlements, Consolidated Banking Statistics (Table 9A) and Securities Statistics (Table 12C) 



































Figure 8C: Reinhart-Rogoff-Savastano Composite Dollarization Index Level vs. 
Exports-to-GDP Ratio for Reinhart-Rogoff-Savastano’s  
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Note: Lao, Nicaragua, and Bosnia & Herzegovina are excluded from this figure because the World Bank 
did not have data on these countries’ exports-to-GDP ratio in 2001. 
Sources: Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, & Miguel A. Savansto, Addicted to Dollars, NBER 
Working Paper 10015, October 2003, at Table 4; World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
(available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/).  43 








































































Note: Lao, Nicaragua, and Bosnia & Herzegovina are excluded from this figure because the World Bank 
did not have data on these countries’ exports-to-GDP ratio in 2001. In addition, Ghana, Tajikstan, Congo 
DR, El Salvador, and Turkmenistan are excluded from the graph because the IMF did not have data on 
these countries’ private credit, or because the BIS did not have data on at least one component of CDDD 
for these countries. 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2002); World Bank, 
World Development Indicators Database (available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/); Bank for 
International Settlements, Consolidated Banking Statistics (Table 9A) and Securities Statistics (Table 12C) 
(available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/index.htm). 
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Figure 9: Mexico’s Nominal Exchange Rate 








































































































































Table 1: Degrees of Dollarization for Reinhart-Rogoff-Savastano’s 
Sixteen Highest Dollarized Countries 
Country  Reinhart-Rogoff-Savastano 
Composite Index Level: 1996-
2001 (Rank) 
CDDD / Private Credit: 
2001 (Rank) 
Exports / GDP: 2001 
(Rank) 
Ecuador  25  (1)  1.123  (11)  0.267  (10) 
Bolivia  22  (2)  1.124  (10)  0.183  (13) 
Uruguay  21  (3)  1.104  (14)  0.187  (12) 
Argentina  20  (4)  1.518  (6)  0.114  (16) 
Bulgaria  19  (5)  1.117  (12)  0.557  (3) 
Lao  17  (6)  1.088  (15)  N/A  N/A 
Nicaragua  17  (6)  1.106  (13)  N/A  N/A 
Angola  16  (8)  10.611  (1)  0.745  (1) 
Peru  16  (8)  1.365  (8)  0.158  (14) 
Cambodia  15  (10)  1.445  (7)  0.532  (4) 
Paraguay  15  (10)  0.864  (17)  0.245  (11) 
Guinea-Bissau  14  (12)  1.839  (4)  0.407  (6) 
Lebanon  14  (12)  1.157  (9)  0.143  (15) 
Mozambique  14  (12)  5.275  (2)  0.283  (8) 
São Tomé & Príncipe  14  (12)  4.381  (3)  0.381  (7) 
Zambia  14  (12)  0.583  (18)  0.271  (9) 
Note: Corporate Dollar-Denominated Debt (CDDD) is equal to the sum of 1) consolidated claims of reporting 
foreign banks on the non-bank private sector of individual countries, 2) international debt securities by corporate 
issuers, and 3) the difference between the nation’s total private credit and local currency claims on local residents. 
Private credit is converted to U.S. dollars using the end-of-2001 exchange rate. 
Sources: Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano, Addicted to Dollars, NBER Working 
Paper 10015, October 2003, at Table 4 (attached as Exhibit D-10); International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook (2002); World Bank, World Development Indicators Database (available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/); Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated Banking Statistics 
(Table 9A) and Securities Statistics (Table 12C) (available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/index.htm). 
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Table 2: Description of Variables 
Variable  Description 
t  Year following devaluation (Argentina: t=2002; Mexico: t=1995). 
Likewise, I define the year preceding devaluation to be: t-1=2001 for 
Argentina, and t-1=1994 for Mexico. 
St  Net revenue in year t, converted to U.S. dollars 
SGt  log(St) – log(St-1) 
SG2yt  log(St + St+1) – log(St-1 + St-2) 
It  Capital expenditures in year t, converted to U.S. dollars 
Kt  Plant, property, and equipment as of December 31 in year t, converted 
to U.S. dollars 
IKRt  It / Kt-1 
IKR2yt  (It + It+1) / Kt-1 
ARG  Argentina dummy variable: equal to 1 if the firm is Argentine, 0 
otherwise 
TR  Tradable dummy: equal to 1 if the firm is in a tradable sector, 0 
otherwise 
At  Total assets as of December 31 in year t, converted to U.S. dollars 
EBITDAt  Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation & amortization in year t, 
converted to U.S. dollars 
DDAt-1  Ratio of dollar-denominated liabilities to total assets on December 31 
in year t-1 
EARt  (EBITDAt – EBITDAt-1) / At-1 
EAR2yt  (EBITDAt + EBITDAt+1 – EBITDAt-1 – EBITDAt-2) / At-1 
KSRt  Kt / St 
Note: I convert all financial data to real 1999 U.S. dollars using December-to-December 
changes in the country’s consumer price index and the exchange rate for December 31, 
1999. I define a firm as “tradable” if its 2-digit NAICS code is 11 (Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fishing, and Hunting), 21 (Mining), or 31-33 (Manufacturing). I exclude firms with 
NAICS codes 52 (Finance and Insurance), 531 (Real Estate), or 55 (Management of 
Companies and Enterprises) from my analyses. I define all other firms as “non-tradable.”  47 
Table 3: Mean Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Plant, Property, and Equipment in the Year 
Following Devaluation (IKRT): 
Argentina (2002) & Mexico (1995) 
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms          








0.0706  9  0.0804  0.0956  17  0.0996  -0.0250  -0.6929  0.2482 
Dif  -0.0353      -0.0227           
T-Stat  -1.2160      -0.5476           
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.1251      0.2946           
           
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms       








0.0875  28  0.1173  0.0670  25  0.0571  0.0205  0.8226  0.7922 
Dif  -0.0580       0.0080             
T-Stat  -2.2348       0.3594             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.0163        0.6393                
Note: In my analyses of Economatica data, the term “dollar-denominated” refers to any item denominated in foreign 
currencies because Economatica does not provide dollar-specific information. Dollar-denominated debt is defined as 
foreign currency-denominated liabilities of all kinds. I define a firm as a “high-dollar debt” firm if the ratio of its 
dollar-denominated liabilities to its total assets on December 31 in the year preceding devaluation is greater than or 
equal to 35 percent. I exclude all firms for which dollar-denominated liabilities were not available for the year 
preceding devaluation, as well as any firms with dollar-denominated liabilities that exceeded total liabilities. I use 
consolidated financial data if dollar-denominated liabilities are available on the firm’s consolidated balance sheet in 
the year preceding devaluation; otherwise I use non-consolidated data if dollar-denominated liabilities are available 
on the firm’s non-consolidated balance sheet in the year preceding devaluation. I convert all data to real 1999 U.S. 
dollars using December-to-December changes in the country’s consumer price index and the exchange rate for 
December 31, 1999. I exclude one outlier Mexican firm from all of my analyses. This firm’s value of SG2yt was -
5.37, which implies a revenue decline of 99.5 percent from 1993-94 to 1995-96. T-statistics are calculated assuming 
unequal variances. 
Source: Economatica.  48 
Table 4: Mean Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Plant, Property, and Equipment in the Two 
Years Following Devaluation (IKR2YT): 
Argentina (2002-03) & Mexico (1995-96) 
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms          








0.0644  5  0.0397  0.2155  7  0.1537  -0.1511  -2.4875  0.0207 
Dif  0.0080       -0.0339             
T-Stat  0.1862       -0.4069             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.5712        0.3456                
           
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms       








0.1625  28  0.2141  0.1224  25  0.0893  0.0401  0.9075  0.8150 
Dif  -0.0914       0.0236             
T-Stat  -1.9155       0.6695             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.0324        0.7463                
Note: See Note for Table 3. 
Source: Economatica.  49 
 
 
Table 5: Mean Log Difference in Revenues in the Year Following Devaluation (SGT): 
Argentina (2002) & Mexico (1995) 
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms          








-0.2008  9  0.3560  0.3385  18  0.4697  -0.5394  -3.3234  0.0016 
Dif  0.1515       -0.1743             
T-Stat  1.0876       -0.8169             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.8522        0.2121                
           
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms       








-0.6014  28  0.3513  -0.2400  25  0.2430  -0.3614  -4.3921  0.0000 
Dif  0.4020       0.0811             
T-Stat  2.7181       0.9969             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.9885        0.8377                
Note: See Note for Table 3.  
Source: Economatica.  50 
Table 6: Mean Log Difference in Revenues in the 
Two Years Following Devaluation (SG2YT): 
Argentina (2002-03) & Mexico (1995-96) 
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms          








-0.2238  8  0.1843  0.3936  14  0.3891  -0.6174  -5.0312  0.0000 
Dif  0.0948       -0.2878             
T-Stat  0.8488       -1.2433             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.7960        0.1156                
           
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms       








-0.3949  28  0.3786  0.0002  25  0.2606  -0.3950  -4.4626  0.0000 
Dif  0.2691       0.0705             
T-Stat  1.9654       0.8170             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.9625        0.7906                
Note: See Note for Table 3.  
Source: Economatica.  51 
Table 7: Mean Earnings Growth in the Year Following Devaluation (EART): 
Argentina (2002) & Mexico (1995) 
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms          








-0.0306  9  0.0351  0.1021  18  0.1701  -0.1327  -3.1765  0.0024 
Dif  0.0068       0.0046             
T-Stat  0.2558       0.0637             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.5991        0.5251                
           
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms       








-0.0512  28  0.0438  -0.0097  25  0.0656  -0.0414  -2.6710  0.0054 
Dif  0.0639       0.0204             
T-Stat  3.2715       1.2553             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.9950        0.8919                
Note: See Note for Table 3.  
Source: Economatica.  52 
Table 8: Mean Earnings Growth in the Two Years Following Devaluation (EAR2YT): 
Argentina (2002-03) & Mexico (1995-96) 
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms          








-0.0818  7  0.0380  0.2565  9  0.2914  -0.3384  -3.4453  0.0041 
Dif  0.0621       0.0886             
T-Stat  0.8917       0.5172             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.7949        0.6916                
           
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms       








-0.0668  27  0.0867  0.0273  25  0.1068  -0.0940  -3.4678  0.0006 
Dif  0.1192       0.0262             
T-Stat  2.3055       0.9040             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.9738        0.8146                
Note: See Note for Table 3.  
Source: Economatica.  53 
Table 9: OLS Regression Statistics for Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Plant, Property, 
and Equipment in the Year Following Devaluation (IKRT): 
Argentina (2002) & Mexico (1995) 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 








IKRt-1  0.0523  3.08  0.0540  3.12 
  (0.0170)  0.003  (0.0173)  0.002 
SGt  0.0156  0.78  0.0137  0.68 
  (0.0199)  0.437  (0.0201)  0.497 
ARG  -0.0313  -0.87  -0.0844  -1.65 
  (0.0361)  0.388  (0.0510)  0.101 
TR  -0.0102  -0.51  -0.0382  -1.22 
  (0.0201)  0.613  (0.0313)  0.225 
DDAt-1  -0.0680  -1.36  -0.1449  -1.79 
  (0.0500)  0.176  (0.0809)  0.076 
TR x ARG  0.0496  1.58  0.1327  2.12 
  (0.0314)  0.116  (0.0626)  0.036 
DDAt-1 x ARG  0.0423  0.54  0.2192  1.63 
  (0.0788)  0.592  (0.1346)  0.106 
TR x DDAt-1      0.1242  1.21 
      (0.1029)  0.230 
TR x DDAt-1 x ARG      -0.2684  -1.64 
       (0.1638)  0.104 
Constant  0.0790  3.73  0.0924  3.67 
   (0.0212)  0.000  (0.0252)  0.000 
         
Regression Statistics         
Observations  130    130   
R
2  0.1138    0.1337   
Adjusted R
2  0.0630    0.0687   
Root MSE  0.0833    0.0830   
Note: See Note for Table 3. 
Source: Economatica.  54 
Table 10: OLS Regression Statistics for Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Plant, Property, and 
Equipment in the Two Years Following Devaluation (IKR2YT): 
Argentina (2002-03) & Mexico (1995-96) 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 








IKRt-1  0.1788  4.66  0.1710  4.41 
  (0.0384)  0.000  (0.0388)  0.000 
SG2yt  0.0762  2.22  0.0774  2.24 
  (0.0343)  0.029  (0.0345)  0.027 
ARG  -0.0529  -0.68  -0.0962  -0.77 
  (0.0781)  0.500  (0.1249)  0.443 
TR  -0.0321  -1.01  -0.0830  -1.71 
  (0.0316)  0.314  (0.0486)  0.091 
DDAt-1  -0.1464  -1.93  -0.2810  -2.28 
  (0.0759)  0.057  (0.1232)  0.025 
TR x ARG  0.1338  2.16  0.2039  1.39 
  (0.0620)  0.033  (0.1467)  0.168 
DDAt-1 x ARG  0.1140  0.66  0.2869  0.91 
  (0.1721)  0.509  (0.3157)  0.366 
TR x DDAt-1      0.2183  1.39 
      (0.1573)  0.169 
TR x DDAt-1 x ARG      -0.2702  -0.72 
       (0.3768)  0.475 
Constant  0.1363  4.26  0.1657  4.31 
   (0.0320)  0.000  (0.0385)  0.000 
         
Regression Statistics         
Observations  104    104   
R
2  0.2931    0.3074   
Adjusted R
2  0.2415    0.2411   
Root MSE  0.1263    0.1263   
Note: See Note for Table 3. 
Source: Economatica.  55 
 
Table 11: Cumulative Raw & Abnormal Returns of Argentine Stocks Over the Five-Day Trading 
Window Around the Redenomination Announcement: 
January 30 – February 7, 2002 
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms          
 Raw 
Returns 








0.0158  3  0.0353  0.1577  11  0.1012  -0.1419  -3.8683  0.0014 
Dif  0.0784       0.1180             
T-Stat  3.1004       2.2715             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.0167        0.0190                
           
   Non-Tradable Firms  Tradable Firms       
Abnormal 
Returns 








0.0105  3  0.0295  0.0617  11  0.1283  -0.0511  -1.2105  0.1247 
Dif  0.0395       0.1804             
T-Stat  0.9943       2.8420             
Pr(Dif ￿ 0)  0.1774        0.0059                
























Before calculating any returns, I convert all closing stock prices to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for that day. Not 
all stocks trade every day. When calculating cumulative raw returns, I set the closing stock price for a day with no trades 
equal to the most recent closing price preceding that day. I only calculate cumulative raw or abnormal returns for a stock 
if it traded on at least one day in the first half of the window (January 30-February 1), before the announcement of 
redenomination of all dollar-denominated debt, and on at least one day in the second half of the window (February 6-7), 
after the announcement of redenomination of all dollar-denominated debt. 
Before calculating cumulative abnormal returns, I estimated regression coefficients for each stock using the market 
model: 
, 0, 1, , , i t i i MERVAL t i t wr wr b b e = + + , 
where wri,t is the weekly return for stock i and the wrMERVAL,t is the weekly return of the MERVAL stock index on week t. 
I estimate the market model for each Argentine stock in my sample over the 52 weeks from December 8, 2000, to 
November 30, 2001. I only calculated wri,t if the stock traded both in week t and in the preceding week t-1. The 









where abri,t is the abnormal return on day t, or 
( ) ( ) , , 0, 1, , 0.6 0.4 i t i t i i MERVAL t abr r r b b = - + + . 
As the abnormal return equation shows, I normalized the beta coefficients to 1 before estimating predicted returns. If a 
stock did not trade on day t in the event window, though, I set abri,t equal to 0. I did not estimate cumulative raw or 
abnormal returns for stocks with fewer than 10 weekly returns in the market model estimation period. T-statistics are 
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Table 12: OLS Regression Statistics for Cumulative Raw & Abnormal Returns of Argentine 
Stocks Over the Five-Day Trading Window 
Around the Redenomination Announcement: 
January 30 – February 7, 2002  
  Dependent Variable 
  Cumulative Raw Returns  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 








TR  0.1561  3.82  0.1249  2.37 
  (0.0409)  0.001  (0.0528)  0.026 
DDAt-1  0.2447  2.33  0.3473  2.56 
  (0.1051)  0.028  (0.1356)  0.017 
Constant  -0.0255  -0.49  -0.0959  -1.42 
   (0.0524)  0.631  (0.0676)  0.168 
         
Regression Statistics         
Observations  29    29   
R
2  0.4070    0.2912   
Adjusted R
2  0.3613    0.2367   
Root MSE  0.1009     0.1301   
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Table 13: Argentine and Mexican Firms in the Investment and Event Study Regression Samples 
Defined as Utilities (Subject to Redenominated Tariffs) or as High-Energy Consumers 
Company Name  Included in Event Study 
Regression Sample? 
Utilities   
Camuzzi Gas Pamp. ORD  No 
Distr Gas Cuyana ORD  No 
Edenor ORD  No 
Edesur ORD  No 
Gas Natural BAN ORD  No 
Metrogas ORD  Yes 
Transener ORD  Yes 
Transp Gas Sur ORD  Yes 
Transp Gas de Norte ORD  No 
   
High-Energy Consumers   
Acindar ORD  Yes 
Aluar ORD  Yes 
Atanor ORD  Yes 
Massuh ORD  No 
Quim Estrella ORD  No 
Rosenbusch ORD  Yes 
Siderar ORD  Yes 
Siderca ORD  Yes 
Solvay Indupa ORD  Yes 
Note: I define a firm as a high-energy consumer if its 3-digit NAICS code is 322 
(Paper), 324 (Petroleum & Coal Products), 325 (Chemicals), or 331 (Primary Metals). 
These four industries were the top manufacturing consumers of energy in 1998 in the 
United States according to the U.S. Department of Energy (see 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb0203.html). I define an Argentine firm as a 
“utility” for the purposes of the regressions if its 2-digit NAICS code is 22 (Utilities) 
and if it was subject to the tariffs being redenominated into pesos. Two Argentine 
firms, Central Costanera ORD and Central Puerto ORD, are classified with the Utilities 
NAICS code in Economatica, but I do not assign them the “utility” dummy variable in 
the regressions because they were not subject to tariffs that were redenominated into 
pesos.  
Source: Economatica.  59 
Table 14: OLS Regression Statistics for Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Plant, Property, and 
Equipment in the Year Following Devaluation (IKRT): 
Argentina (2002) & Mexico (1995) 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 








IKRt-1  0.0516  2.97  0.0537  2.99 
  (0.0173)  0.004  (0.0180)  0.003 
SGt  0.0073  0.36  0.0058  0.28 
  (0.0205)  0.721  (0.0207)  0.781 
ARG  -0.0177  -0.43  -0.0710  -1.19 
  (0.0417)  0.671  (0.0597)  0.237 
TR  -0.0078  -0.39  -0.0355  -1.13 
  (0.0200)  0.700  (0.0312)  0.259 
DDAt-1  -0.0664  -1.34  -0.1425  -1.77 
  (0.0497)  0.184  (0.0806)  0.080 
TR x ARG  0.0209  0.56  0.1016  1.43 
  (0.0376)  0.579  (0.0713)  0.156 
DDAt-1 x ARG  0.0421  0.53  0.2080  1.50 
  (0.0793)  0.596  (0.1388)  0.136 
TR x DDAt-1      0.1227  1.20 
      (0.1025)  0.234 
TR x DDAt-1 x ARG      -0.2489  -1.49 
       (0.1667)  0.138 
Utility x ARG  -0.0233  -0.60  -0.0140  -0.35 
  (0.0386)  0.548  (0.0401)  0.727 
HighEnergy x ARG  0.0592  1.70  0.0581  1.67 
  (0.0348)  0.091  (0.0348)  0.097 
Constant  0.0747  3.49  0.0879  3.45 
   (0.0214)  0.001  (0.0255)  0.001 
         
Regression Statistics         
Observations  130    130   
R
2  0.1378    0.1549   
Adjusted R
2  0.0731    0.0761   
Root MSE  0.0828    0.0827   
Note: See Notes for Tables 3 and 13. 
Source: Economatica.  60 
 Table 15: OLS Regression Statistics for Ratio of Capital Expenditures to Plant, Property, and 
Equipment in the Two Years Following Devaluation (IKR2YT): 
Argentina (2002-03) & Mexico (1995-96) 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 








IKRt-1  0.1778  4.58  0.1701  4.34 
  (0.0388)  0.000  (0.0392)  0.000 
SG2yt  0.0779  2.23  0.0797  2.26 
  (0.0350)  0.028  (0.0353)  0.026 
ARG  -0.0325  -0.35  -0.0639  -0.43 
  (0.0932)  0.728  (0.1481)  0.667 
TR  -0.0327  -1.02  -0.0841  -1.71 
  (0.0320)  0.309  (0.0491)  0.090 
DDAt-1  -0.1466  -1.91  -0.2817  -2.26 
  (0.0766)  0.059  (0.1244)  0.026 
TR x ARG  0.1234  1.51  0.1779  1.05 
  (0.0818)  0.135  (0.1700)  0.298 
DDAt-1 x ARG  0.1063  0.61  0.2486  0.75 
  (0.1756)  0.546  (0.3317)  0.455 
TR x DDAt-1      0.2190  1.38 
      (0.1588)  0.171 
TR x DDAt-1 x ARG      -0.2275  -0.58 
       (0.3920)  0.563 
Utility x ARG  -0.0358  -0.44  -0.0358  -0.42 
  (0.0817)  0.662  (0.0848)  0.674 
HighEnergy x ARG  -0.0192  -0.25  -0.0203  -0.27 
  (0.0755)  0.800  (0.0756)  0.789 
Constant  0.1373  4.23  0.1669  4.29 
   (0.0324)  0.000  (0.0389)  0.000 
         
Regression Statistics         
Observations  104    104   
R
2  0.2950    0.3093   
Adjusted R
2  0.2275    0.2267   
Root MSE  0.1274    0.1275   
Note: See Notes for Tables 3 and 13. 
Source: Economatica.  61 
 
Table 16: OLS Regression Statistics for Cumulative Raw & Abnormal Returns of Argentine 
Stocks Over the Five-Day Trading Window 
Around the Devaluation Announcement: 
January 2 – January 18, 2002  
  Dependent Variable 
  Cumulative Raw Returns  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 








TR  0.2857  1.80  0.3518  2.08 
  (0.1584)  0.086  (0.1695)  0.051 
DDAt-1  0.3566  1.09  0.2074  0.59 
  (0.3271)  0.289  (0.3500)  0.560 
Utility  -0.1484  -0.69  -0.1158  -0.51 
  (0.2141)  0.496  (0.2291)  0.619 
HighEnergy  0.1718  1.21  0.0873  0.57 
  (0.1423)  0.241  (0.1522)  0.573 
Constant  -0.0844  -0.48  0.0717  0.38 
   (0.1743)  0.634  (0.1865)  0.705 
         
Regression Statistics         
Observations  25    25   
R
2  0.3841    0.3475   
Adjusted R
2  0.2610    0.2170   
Root MSE  0.2886    0.3088   
Note: See Note for Table 11. The calculation of returns is the same as in the window around the 
redenomination announcement. The same restrictions to the sample of firms included in the 
regression also apply to the devaluation window. The first half of this five-day trading window is 
January 2-4, and the second half of the window is January 17-18. No Argentine stocks traded from 
January 5 through January 16.  62 
 
Table 17: OLS Regression Statistics for Cumulative Raw & Abnormal Returns of Argentine 
Stocks Over the Five-Day Trading Window 
Around the Redenomination Announcement: 
January 30 – February 7, 2002  
  Dependent Variable 
  Cumulative Raw Returns  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 








TR  0.1168  2.44  0.0659  1.06 
  (0.0478)  0.022  (0.0622)  0.300 
DDAt-1  0.2597  2.52  0.3780  2.82 
  (0.1031)  0.019  (0.1342)  0.010 
Utility   -0.0237  -0.34  -0.0731  -0.80 
  (0.0699)  0.737  (0.0910)  0.430 
HighEnergy   0.0919  2.02  0.1039  1.76 
  (0.0455)  0.055  (0.0591)  0.092 
Constant  -0.0233  -0.44  -0.0832  -1.21 
   (0.0526)  0.662  (0.0685)  0.236 
         
Regression Statistics         
Observations  29    29   
R
2  0.4951    0.3860   
Adjusted R
2  0.4109    0.2837   
Root MSE  0.0970     0.1261   
 
 
 